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             for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge. 
 
     Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
("State Farm"), an Illinois corporation, filed an action for a 
declaratory judgment in federal district court, seeking a 
declaration regarding its obligations to appellant Herbert Powell 
("Powell") under insurance policies it had issued to him for 
underinsured motorist coverage.  The district court ultimately 
granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm.   
     On appeal, we dismiss this matter for lack of jurisdiction.  
While State Farm alleged diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
1332(a), we conclude that the amount in controversy does not 
exceed $50,000. 
                                I. 
     On May 11, 1991, Powell was struck by a vehicle owned by 
Kenneth Wagner, sustaining personal injuries.  He received 
$25,000 from Wagner's insurance company, which was the maximum 
amount of coverage under Wagner's policy.  
     Powell then sought coverage under policies he had purchased 
from State Farm.  Under Pennsylvania law, an insured may "stack" 
his coverage for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage; 
that is "[t]he limits of coverages available . . . shall be the 
sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured 
person is an insured." 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  1738(a).  At the 
time he sought coverage, both Powell and State Farm believed that 
Powell had purchased three policies from State Farm which could 
be applied to the accident, each of which provided for $50,000 
coverage per person.  Powell thus sought $150,000 from State Farm 
to compensate him for his injuries from the accident. 
     State Farm refused to provide him with the requested 
coverage because Powell had executed a waiver of his stacking 
rights in exchange for a reduction in his monthly premiums from 
$18 to $11.  The language of the waiver signed by Powell reads as 
follows: 
     By signing this waiver, I am rejecting stacked limits 
     of underinsured motorist coverage under the policy for 
     myself and members of my household under which the 
     limits of coverage available would be the sum of limits 
     for each motor vehicle insured under the policy.  
     Instead, the limits of coverage that I am purchasing 
     shall be reduced to the limits stated in the policy. I 
     knowingly and voluntarily reject the stacked limits of 
     coverage.  I understand that my premiums will be  reduced if I reject 
this coverage. 
Appendix at 51-52.  State Farm believed that, based upon the 
language, Powell was entitled to a total of only $50,000 from 
State Farm, and it entered into a settlement with Powell to pay 
this amount on November 4, 1993.  Powell, however, maintained 
that his signature on the waiver did not bar him from stacking 
separate insurance policy coverage.    
     State Farm eventually filed an action in federal district 
court for declaratory judgment on April 13, 1994 in order to 
determine its responsibilities under the policy.  In its 
complaint, it alleged that although Powell had three insurance 
policies in effect at the time of the Wagner accident, Powell had 
executed a valid waiver of his stacking rights and it requested 
the district court to declare "that the plaintiff, State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, is only obliged to provide 
underinsured motorists coverage in the instant case in an amount 
of $50,000. . . ." App. at 15-16.   State Farm subsequently 
discovered that one of the three policies it issued to Powell was 
not purchased until after the accident at issue here, and it thus 
filed a motion to amend its complaint accordingly, which was 
granted.     
     Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Powell 
moved for partial summary judgment.  All three motions were 
denied by the district court.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Powell, 879 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Pa. 1995).  The court rejected 
Powell's theory that the waiver he signed barred stacking only in 
cases where a single policy insured more than one car, not when 
an insured purchased separate policies for separate cars.  Id. at 
541.  However, it also stated that disputed factual questions 
remained as to how many policies were in effect at the time of 
the Wagner accident and whether Powell received any consideration 
for his waiver.  Id.  Thus, it also denied State Farm's motion. 
     Powell subsequently filed another motion for summary 
judgment, in which he stated that two policies were in effect at 
the time of the accident and that he received a $7.00 savings per 
policy as a result of executing the waivers at issue.  However, 
he took issue with the district court's previous analysis of the 
meaning of the waivers he had signed and requested that the court 
enter a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to a total of 
$100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage.  
     State Farm also filed a new motion for summary judgment, 
requesting that the court enter a declaration that Powell was 
barred from stacking his underinsured motorists coverage on his 
two policies, and that State Farm "is only obliged to provide 
motorist coverage of the instant case in the amount of $50,000 . 
. . ." App. at 206-7.   
     This time the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of State Farm, entering a declaration stating: 
     (1)  75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann.  1738 bars Defendant, 
     Herbert   Powell, in the instant case from stacking UIM 
     coverage on the two vehicles in his household insured 
     with Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
     Company;  
 
     (2)  Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
     company, is only obliged to provide underinsured 
     motorist coverage in the instant case in the amount of 
     $50,000. 
      
     Powell appeals from this order. 
  
                               II. 
     As an initial matter, Powell argues that diversity 
jurisdiction is lacking under 28 U.S.C.  1332(a) because the 
amount in controversy does not exceed $50,000, and that the 
judgment below thus should be dismissed.  Although Powell did not 
raise this jurisdictional issue below, we may address it for the 
first time on appeal "[b]ecause the limited subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts is so fundamental a concern in 
our system."  Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(citing Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)).   
     In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 
283 (1937), the Supreme Court announced the following rule 
regarding the requisite amount in controversy for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction: 
 
     [U]nless the law gives a different rule, the sum 
     claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is 
     apparently made in good faith.  It must appear to a 
     legal certainty that the claim is really for less than 
     the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. 
Id. at 288-89. See also Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 
873, 877 (3d Cir. 1995).   
     In the instant matter Powell does not claim that State Farm 
alleged its amount in controversy in bad faith.  Rather, he 
explains in his brief before this court that when this action was 
originally filed, both parties mistakenly believed that three 
separate insurance policies, each providing $50,000 coverage, 
were in effect on the date of Powell's injury.  However, when the 
parties later discovered that one of the policies was purchased 
after the accident occurred, and the complaint was amended to 
reflect that discovery, it became clear that only two policies, 
valued at $100,000 total, formed the subject matter of the 
litigation.   
     Powell asserts that with only two policies applicable to the 
accident, it is clear "to a legal certainty" that the actual 
amount in controversy is only $50,000 -- a penny shy of the 
jurisdictional minimum.  He explains that at the time State Farm 
filed its declaratory judgment action in federal court, it had 
already entered a settlement to pay him $50,000 under one policy.  
Thus, all that remained in dispute at the time the suit was filed 
was $50,000 from the other policy. 
     State Farm counters with three alternative arguments in 
support of jurisdiction.  First, it asserts that because 
diversity jurisdiction was proper when the complaint was filed, 
it should not be disturbed by subsequent events.  Second, it 
argues that even if the third policy is not considered, its 
"total potential exposure" of $100,000 (the sum of the remaining 
two policies) is the actual amount in controversy. Appellee's 
Brief at 14.  Third, it contends that even if only one policy is 
"at issue," the arbitration costs provided for in the policy 
should be considered in determining the amount in controversy. 
Id. at 14-15.  We will consider each of these arguments in turn. 
                                A. 
     State Farm first argues that the federal courts retain 
jurisdiction over this matter because, at the time that it filed 
its complaint, it believed that three $50,000 insurance policies 
were at issue, totalling $150,000, and subsequent events cannot 
destroy jurisdiction if jurisdiction was proper when the 
complaint was filed.  It is true that a federal court's 
jurisdiction ordinarily depends upon "the facts as they exist 
when the complaint is filed," Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo- 
Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989), and thus subsequent events 
that reduce the amount in controversy below the statutory minimum 
do not require dismissal. See Jones v. Knox Exploration Corp., 2 
F.3d 181, 182-83 (6th Cir. 1993).  However, "[a] distinction must 
be made . . . between subsequent events that change the amount in 
controversy and subsequent revelations that, in fact, the 
required amount was or was not in controversy at the commencement 
of the action." Id. at 183 (emphasis added).  
     With respect to the issue regarding the number of policies 
at issue in the case, State Farm's situation falls into the 
latter category.  In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm 
admits that "[w]hile initially there was some dispute as to this 
matter, it has since been determined and agreed upon that at all 
times relevant hereto, the Defendant had two separate policies of 
insurance issued by the Plaintiff insuring two separate vehicles 
owned by the Defendant." App. at 204.  Under these circumstances, 
the discovery that one of the original three policies was not in 
effect during Powell's accident should be considered a revelation 
that only two policies were at issue when the litigation was 
commenced, not a "subsequent event."  Accordingly, jurisdiction 
must be assessed based upon the factual reality that only two 
policies were in effect at the time of the accident. 
                                B. 
     State Farm next argues that, even if the court does not 
consider the third insurance policy once thought to be at issue 
in determining diversity jurisdiction, the amount at issue 
continues to exceed $50,000.  It avers that under the two 
policies actually at issue, its total exposure is $100,000 and 
that this amount should be considered the amount in controversy.  
     State Farm, however, never denied that it was obligated to 
provide Powell with at least $50,000 in coverage.  In fact, the 
relief it sought from the district court was a declaration that 
it was "only obliged to provide underinsured motorist coverage in 
the instant case in the amount of $50,000."  App. at 207.  Thus, 
from the outset of this litigation State Farm conceded that it 
owed Powell $50,000; it merely sought to limit its obligation to 
that figure out of his alleged $100,000 in underinsured motorist 
coverage.  Indeed, as evidenced by the letter dated November 4, 
1993 from State Farm to Powell, State Farm actually entered into 
a settlement with Powell to pay him the $50,000 prior to the 
commencement of this action.  Simple arithmetic demonstrates that 
at the time that the action was filed, then, only $50,000 was in 
controversy. 
                                C. 
     State Farm finally argues that even if the Court finds -- as 
we do -- that only the $50,000 policy for which no payment was 
received is at issue in this case, its contractual duty to pay 
arbitration costs brings the amount in controversy above the 
jurisdictional prerequisite.  State Farm points to language in 
the insurance policies at issue that provides for the parties to 
pay certain costs related to arbitrating the underlying insurance 
motorist claim.  The relevant language reads as follows: 
     If there is no agreement [between the insured and State 
     Farm regarding whether the insured is legally entitled 
     to collect damages or the amount of such damages], 
     these questions shall be decided by arbitration at the 
     request of the insured or [State Farm.] . . .  
 
                           *   *   *    
 
     The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall 
     be paid by the party who hired them.  The cost of the 
     third arbitrator and other expenses of the arbitration 
     shall be shared equally by both parties. 
App. at 33.   
     State Farm points out that, while costs and attorneys' fees 
are not normally considered when determining the amount in 
controversy, "where the underlying instrument or contract itself 
provides for their payment, costs and attorneys' fees must be 
considered in determining the jurisdictional amount." Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rowles, 818 F. Supp. 852, 854-55 (E.D. Pa. 1992) 
(citing Springstead v. Crawfordsville State Bank, 231 U.S. 541 
(1913); Farmers Ins. Co. v. McClain, 603 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 
1979)).  In particular it refers this court to a decision from 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rowles.  There, the district court 
found that, in a case where the insurance policy at issue was 
only for $50,000, the insurer's obligation under the terms of the 
policy to pay arbitration expenses raised the amount at issue 
above the $50,000 statutory minimum for jurisdictional purposes.  
Id. at 855.   
     As an initial matter, we question the reasoning of the 
district court's decision in Rowles.  In arriving at its 
conclusion, the Rowles court relied upon two cases, Springsteadand McClain 
which held that costs and attorneys' fees should be 
considered part of the amount in controversy for jurisdictional 
purposes when they are mandated by underlying instruments or 
contracts.  In those two cases, however, the contracts at issue 
called for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs by the party 
breaching the contract.  Springstead, 231 U.S. at 541; McClain, 
603 F.2d at 822.  Thus, the costs were essentially additional 
damages to be assessed against the party found to have breached 
the instrument, and were thus part of the controversy at issue in 
those cases.   
     However, the arbitration provision at issue in Rowles (as 
well as in the instant case) does not provide for additional 
damages to be assessed against the party who does not prevail.  
Rather, it merely provides that the costs associated with 
arbitration will be shared evenly by the two parties.  Thus, 
these costs were never in controversy, but simply were to be 
shared by the parties regardless of ultimate responsibility for 
the breach.         
     Furthermore, even if we considered the Rowles reasoning 
sound, we think that that decision is nonetheless inapposite to 
the case at hand.  In Rowles the underlying policy mandated 
arbitration in the event of a dispute over coverage, providing 
that "[i]f [the insurer] and the insured do not agree about the 
insured's right to recover damages or the amount of damages, the 
following arbitration procedure will be used."  Id. at 854 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, before the insurer filed the federal 
suit in Rowles, the insured had sought to arbitrate the dispute 
according to the arbitration provision.  Id.  The provisions 
governing arbitration in the insurance policy at issue in the 
instant case, however, are not mandatory and do not specifically 
impose a duty to pay on the part of State Farm.  Rather, the 
policy provides that if State Farm and the insured do not agree 
on coverage, coverage "shall be decided by arbitration at the 
request of the insured or us." App. at 33 (emphasis added).  Only 
if arbitration is requested will the parties then bear the extra 
cost of paying for the arbitration.      
     Here, State Farm did not plead in its complaint that it 
intended to pursue arbitration and would thus incur the alleged 
costs.  See Dept. of Recreation and Sports v. World Boxing 
Ass'n., 942 F.2d 84, 89 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining that a 
plaintiff must plead in his complaint that he has or will incur 
attorneys' fees as provided by statute or contract in order for 
such costs to be considered part of the amount in controversy for 
jurisdictional purposes).  Rather, that State Farm elected to 
bring this case to federal court, indicates that it affirmatively 
opted not to pursue arbitration.  Indeed, if the suit were to 
continue in federal court, we cannot see how any arbitration 
costs would be incurred.   
     Having concluded that the cost of arbitration should not be 
considered part of the amount in controversy for jurisdictional 
purposes, it is clear that the amount in controversy at issue 
here is limited to $50,000. 
 
                               III. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of the 
district court granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm 
and remand this matter to the district court for purposes of 
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
